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Abstract
We study the gap between the state pension provided by the Italian pension system
pre-Dini reform and post-Dini reform. The goal is to fill the gap between the old and
the new pension by joining a defined contribution pension scheme and adopting an
optimal investment strategy that is target-based. We find that it is possible to cover,
at least partially, this gap with the additional income of the pension scheme, especially
in the presence of late retirement and in the presence of stagnant career. Workers with
dynamic career and workers who retire early are those who are most penalised by the
reform. Results are intuitive and in line with previous studies on the subject.
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1 Introduction
During the last few decades, several countries across the world have faced the ageing popula-
tion problem. It is well known that the ageing of the population threatens the sustainability
of Pays-As-You-Go pension systems, that is essentially based on a sufficiently high ratio
workers to pensioner. To tackle this issue, many governments have introduced new reforms
that lead to deep changes into the pension systems.
In particular, in Italy, the Dini reform (introduced in 1995) instituted a completely different
pension system for the new classes of workers. Before the reform, the public pension was
provided through a defined benefit salary-related system. Namely, the pension provided was
simply a service-based percentage of the last salary of the worker. After the reform, the
public pension has been provided through a contribution-based system, where the worker
contributes by himself to build his pension.
This remarkable change generated two different classes of workers, the pre-reform workers
and the post-reform workers, and lead to a pension gap between their corresponding pension
rates and replacement ratios.
The aim of this paper is to illustrate a possible way to fill this pension gap investing op-
timally in a defined contribution (DC) pension fund during the working life. In order to
achieve the goal, a stochastic optimal control problem with suitable annual targets is solved.
We consider two different salary growths to represent two different classes of workers: a linear
salary growth (blue-collar workers) and an exponential salary growth (white-collar workers).
A numerical section illustrates the practical application of the model. Our results are in line
with previous results on the comparison between the old pre-reform Italian pension and the
new post-reform one, see Borella & Coda Moscarola (2006) and Borella & Coda Moscarola
(2010). We find that the gap between salary-related pension and contribution-based pension
is larger for workers with dynamic career than for workers with a stagnant career. A slow
salary increase associated to late retirement can produce a new pension that is almost equal
to (or even exceeds) the old pension. Expectedly, the gap is easier to cover in the case of
late retirement, and vice versa. Interestingly, the gap increases when the rate of growth of
the salary increases.
The reminder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the milestones of the
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Italian pension system and the consequences of the Dini reform. In Section 3 we build the
model and the corresponding stochastic optimal control problem. In Section 4 we derive
the closed-form solutions to the problem for the two different salary growths considered. In
Section 5 we carry out some simulations in order to test the model and show the behaviour
of the optimal investment strategy and the optimal fund growth in a base case scenario. In
Section 6 we make sensitivity analysis of the pension distribution with respect to retirement
age. In Section 7 we investigate the break even points that lead the “new” pension to equal
the “old” pension. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Italian pension provision
The Italian pension system has been modified through a series of legislative measures taken
by different governments during the 90s. We only hint at the Dini reform which is useful in
order to understand the following model.
The Dini reform (law 335, 1995) has changed the system for the calculation of the pension
from a salary-based system to a contribution-related system. The workers shifted from one
system to the other depending on the contributions paid at the end of 1995. Therefore, three
different situations were created:
1. The workers with at least eighteen years of contributions on 31/12/1995 remained
under the salary-related system and therefore they were not touched by the reform.
2. The workers with less than eighteen years of contributions on 31/12/1995 were sub-
jected to a mixed method.
3. The workers who were first employed after 31/12/1995 are subjected to the contribution-
based system.
In this paper, we compare the method for the calculation of the public pension before the
Dini reform with the “new” method for the calculation of the public pension in Italy after
the reform.
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The formula for the pension rate Po before the Dini reform was
Po = 0.02 · T · S(T ), (1)
where S(T ) is the final salary and T indicates the number of past working years. In the
following, we shall call the pension rate (1) the “old pension”. The old pension is a percentage
of the product of the last salary by the years of service, and the related net replacement ratio
— which is the ratio between the first pension rate received after retirement and the last
salary perceived before retirement — is given by
Πo =
Po
S(T )
= 0.02 · T.
In contrast, the new formula for the pension rate Pn is described by
Pn = β · c ·
T−1∑
t=0
S(t)(1 + w)T−t, (2)
where
• β is the conversion coefficient between a lump sum and the annuity rate, and its choice
should reflect actuarial fairness. If it does, then β = 1/a¨x, where a¨x is the single
premium of a lifetime annuity issued to a policyholder aged x, i.e.,
a¨x =
ω−x∑
n=1
npx · v
n, (3)
where ω is the extreme age, v = 1/(1 + r) is the annual discount factor and npx is the
survival probability from age x to age x+ n.
• c is the contribution percentage for the calculation of the pension rate (supposed to be
constant during the whole working life and, for the employees, set by law to 33%).
• T indicates the number of past working years.
• w is the mean real GDP increase.
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In the following, we shall call the pension rate (2) the “new pension”. Compared to the old
pension, the new pension is given by a complicated formula and depends not only on all the
salaries but also on other parameters. Its related net replacement ratio is
Πn =
Pn
S(T )
.
3 The optimization problem
The main idea of this paper is the following.
We assume that the worker was firstly employed after 31/12/1995 and will receive the
new pension (2) from the first pillar (i.e., the public pension), but he wants to integrate it
with additional income from the second pillar (i.e., the private pension funds) to obtain a
pension rate that is as close as possible to the one that he would have obtained with the old
pension rule (1). Since the Dini reform, and apart from a few exceptions accessible only by
self-employed (not considered in this paper), pension funds in Italy are defined contribution
(DC) and not defined benefit (DB). This means that the contribution to be paid into the
fund is fixed a priori in the scheme’s rules and the benefit obtained at retirement depends
on the investment performance of the fund in the accumulation period.
We assume that at time 0 the worker joins a DC pension scheme and has control on the
investment strategy to be adopted on the time horizon [0, T ], where T is the retirement time.
The financial market consists of two assets, a riskless asset B = {B(t)}t≥0 and a risky asset
Z = {Z(t)}t≥0, whose dynamics are described by
dB(t) = rB(t)dt, (4)
dZ(t) = µZ(t)dt+ σZ(t)dW (t), (5)
where r is a constant rate of interest and {W (t)}t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion defined
and adapted on a complete filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P). We assume that
the contribution c(t) paid into the fund at time t is a fixed proportion of the salary of the
member
c(t) = kS(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
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where k ∈ (0, 1) and S(t) is the salary of the member at time t. Finally, the proportion of
portfolio invested into the risky asset at time t ∈ [0, T ] is y(t). Hence, the dynamics of the
wealth are described by the following SDE
{
dX(t) = {[(µ− r)y(t) + r]X(t) + c(t)}dt+ σy(t)X(t)dW (t)
X(0) = x0
(6)
where x0 ≥ 0 is the initial wealth paid into the fund (it can also be a transfer value from
another pension fund). Because the aim of the worker is to reach a pension rate that is as
close as possible to that of the salary-related method, we assume that there exist annual
targets {F (t)}t=0,1,2,...T that he wants to achieve, and that his preferences are described by
the loss suffered when the targets are not met. Thus, we introduce the following quadratic
loss (or disutility) function
L(t, X(t)) = (F (t)−X(t))2, t ∈ [0, T ].
Remark 1. The use of a quadratic loss is very common in the context of pension funds. Some
examples are Boulier, Trussant & Florens (1995), Boulier, Michel & Wisnia (1996), Cairns
(2000), Gerrard, Haberman & Vigna (2004), Gerrard, Haberman & Vigna (2006), Gerrard,
Højgaard & Vigna (2012). Moreover, Vigna (2014) and Menoncin & Vigna (2017) deeply
analyse and discuss the link between “utility-based” approach and “target-based” approach.
From a theoretical point of view, the quadratic loss function also penalizes any deviations
above the target, and this can be considered as a drawback to the model. However, the choice
of trying to achieve a target and no more than this has the effect of a natural limitation on
the overall risk of the portfolio: once the desired target is reached, there is no reason for
further exposure to risk and therefore the surplus becomes undesirable. This is in accordance
also with the fact that the mean-variance approach to portfolio selection has been shown
to be equivalent to the minimization of a quadratic loss function: see the seminal papers
by Zhou & Li (2000) and Li & Ng (2000), and, in the context of DC pension schemes,
Vigna (2014). The idea that people act by following subjective targets is also accepted in
the decision theory literature. For instance, Kahneman & Tversky (1979) support the use
of targets in the cost function, and Bordley & Li Calzi (2000) investigate and support the
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target-based approach in decision making under uncertainty.
We now need to define the targets. Recalling that the worker’s goal is to reach the old
pension pre-Dini reform, we set as final target F (T ) the amount that the retiree aged x
should pay to an insurance company in order to fill the gap between the previous pension
rate and the current one, i.e.,
F (T ) = (Po − Pn)a¨x, (7)
where a¨x is the price of the annuity given by (3) to a retiree aged x, Po is given by (1), Pn
is the continuous formulation of equation (2), which means
Pn = βc
ˆ T
0
S(t)ew(T−t)dt.
The interim targets F (t) for t ∈ [0, T ) are set to be the compounded value of fund plus
contributions using the interest rate r∗ that matches a continuity condition between interim
targets and final target, i.e.
F (t) = x0e
r∗t +
ˆ t
0
c(s)er
∗(t−s)ds, (8)
with r∗ such that1
lim
t→T−
F (t) = F (T ). (9)
The worker’s goal is to minimize the conditional expected losses that can be experienced
from the fund until retirement
E0,x0
[ˆ T
0
e−ρsL(s,X(s))ds+ e−ρTL(T,X(T ))
]
, (10)
where ρ > 0 is the (subjective) intertemporal discount factor.
As usual in optimization problems in DC pension schemes, the contribution rate is not a
control variable, and the only control variable for the worker is the share of portfolio y(t) to
be invested into the risky asset at time t ∈ [0, T ]. To formulate the optimization problem,
1We will approximate the value r∗ with Newton-Raphson algorithm.
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we define the performance criterion at time t with wealth x, i.e.,
Jt,x(y(·)) = Et,x
[ˆ T
t
e−ρsL(s,X(s))ds+ e−ρTL(T,X(T ))
]
(11)
and the admissible strategies.
Definition 3.1. An investment strategy y(·) is said to be admissible if y(·) ∈ L2F(0, T ;R).
The minimization problem, then, becomes
Minimize J0,x0(y(·)) (12)
over the set of admissible strategies.
4 Solution
In order to solve the optimization problem (12), the value function is defined as
V (t, x) := inf
y(·)
Jt,x(y(·)) ∀(t, x) ∈ U = [0, T ]× (−∞,+∞). (13)
Remark 2. In this work, we neither set boundaries on the values that the fund X(·) can
assume, nor set boundaries on the share y(t) to be invested in the risky asset. The existence
of a minimum finite bound on X(t) would be desirable, as well as proper boundaries on the
investment strategy. The former would be intended to protect the retiree from outliving his
asset and not being able to buy a minimum level of pension at time T , the latter to comply
with the usual forbiddance of short-selling and borrowing. However, adding restrictions to
the state variable and the control variable means adding boundary conditions to the problem
and this makes it extremely hard (and often impossible) to solve analytically. Among the
few works that treat optimization problems with restrictions in DC pension schemes, see
Di Giacinto, Federico & Gozzi (2011) and Di Giacinto, Federico, Gozzi & Vigna (2014).
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We write the HJB equation
inf
y∈R
[e−ρtL(t, x) + LyV (t, x)] = 0, ∀ (t, x) ∈ U (14)
V (T, x) = e−ρTL(T, x), ∀ x ∈ R,
where
Luf(t, x) =
∂
∂t
f(t, x) + b(t, x, u)
∂
∂x
f(t, x) +
1
2
σ2(t, x, u)
∂2
∂x2
f(t, x)
is the infinitesimal operator and the functions b(·) and σ(·) are the drift and the diffusion
terms of the process X = {X(t)}t≥0 defined by (6).
Substituting into (14), we obtain ∀(t, x) ∈ U ,
inf
y∈R
{
e−ρt(F (t)− x)2 +
∂V
∂t
+ [x(y(µ− r) + r) + c(t)]
∂V
∂x
+
1
2
x2y2σ2
∂2V
∂x2
}
= 0, (15)
with the boundary condition
V (T, x) = e−ρTL(T, x). (16)
To have an easier notation, let us define
ψ(t, x, y) := e−ρt(F (t)− x)2 +
∂V
∂t
+ [x(y(µ− r) + r) + c(t)]
∂V
∂x
+
1
2
x2y2σ2
∂2V
∂x2
. (17)
Thus, equation (15) becomes
inf
y∈R
ψ(t, x, y) = 0 ⇒ ψ(t, x, y∗) = 0. (18)
The first and second order conditions are
ψy(t, x, y
∗) = 0, (19)
ψyy(t, x, y
∗) > 0. (20)
Therefore, (19) becomes
x(µ− r)
∂V
∂x
+ x2y∗σ2
∂2V
∂x2
= 0,
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so that
y∗ = −
µ− r
σ
1
xσ
Vx
Vxx
. (21)
Moreover, condition (20) is satisfied if and only if
x2σ2
∂2V
∂x2
> 0 ⇔
∂2V
∂x2
> 0. (22)
We will show later that this condition is actually satisfied, so that the solution is a minimum.
By substituting (21) into (18), we obtain the non-linear PDE
e−ρt(F (t)− x)2 + Vt + [rx+ c(t)]Vx −
1
2
(
µ− r
σ
)2
V 2x
Vxx
= 0. (23)
We guess a solution of the form
V (t, x) = e−ρt[α(t)x2 + β(t)x+ γ(t)]. (24)
From the boundary condition (16), we obtain
e−ρT (F (T )− x)2 = e−ρT [α(T )x2 + β(T )x+ γ(T )], ∀x ∈ (−∞,+∞),
so that
α(T ) = 1, β(T ) = −2F (T ), γ(T ) = [F (T )]2. (25)
The partial derivatives of V are
Vt(t, x) = −ρe
−ρt[α(t)x2 + β(t)x+ γ(t)] + e−ρt[α′(t)x2 + β ′(t)x+ γ′(t)],
Vx(t, x) = e
−ρt[2α(t)x+ β(t)], Vxx(t, x) = 2e
−ρtα(t),
and substituting them into (21), we derive the optimal investment strategy at time t with
wealth x, i.e.,
y∗(t, x) = −
µ− r
σ
1
xσ
(
x+
β(t)
2α(t)
)
. (26)
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Substituting the partial derivatives of V (·, ·) into (23), we have
[1 − ρα(t) + α′(t) + 2rα(t)− λ2α(t)]x2 + [−2F (t)− ρβ(t) + β ′(t) + rβ(t)+
+ 2α(t)c(t)− λ2β(t)]x+
[
F (t)2 − ργ(t) + γ′(t) + c(t)β(t)− λ2
β(t)2
4α(t)
]
= 0, (27)
where λ := (µ− r)/σ is the Sharpe ratio of the risky asset.
Since (27) must hold ∀(t, x) ∈ U , we derive the following system of ODE’s


α′(t) = [ρ+ λ2 − 2r]α(t)− 1 = aα(t)− 1
β ′(t) = [ρ+ λ2 − r]β(t) + 2F (t)− 2c(t)α(t) = a˜β(t) + 2F (t)− 2c(t)α(t)
γ′(t) = ργ(t)− F (t)2 − c(t)β(t) + λ2 β(t)
2
4α(t)
(28)
where we have defined a := ρ+ λ2 − 2r, a˜ = a+ r, and with the boundary conditions (25).
4.1 Solution of the problem with two different salary evolutions
Two different salaries are compared: a linear salary
Sl(t) = S0(1 + glt), t ∈ [0, T ], (29)
and an exponential salary
Se(t) = S0e
get, t ∈ [0, T ], (30)
where S0 is the initial salary and gi (i = l, e) is the mean real salary increase.
The contribution in the two cases is
ci(t) = kiSi(t), t ∈ [0, T ], i = l, e,
Remark 3. We have selected two simple models for the salary growth for analytical tractabil-
ity and the aim of providing closed-form solutions for the optimal investment strategy.2 The
2 For a more accurate and realistic model for the salary growth in the Italian context we refer to the
micro-simulation model developed by Borella & Coda Moscarola (2006) and Borella & Coda Moscarola
(2010).
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two different salary growths may represent two different categories of workers, the exponen-
tial growth being associated to white-collar workers with dynamic salary increase, the linear
salary increase being associated to blue-collar workers with smooth salary increase. The
distinct k′s reflect the assumption that the savings capacity of white-collar workers is higher
than the savings capacity of blue-collar workers.
Therefore, there are also two different families of targets.
For the linear salary case (for notational convenience, in the following we will write g and k
in the place of gl and kl):
Fl(t) = x0e
r∗t +
ˆ t
0
kS0(1 + gs)e
r∗(t−s)ds (31)
=
[
x0 +
kS0
r∗
+
kgS0
(r∗)2
]
er
∗t −
kgS0
r∗
t−
kS0
r∗
[
1 +
g
r∗
]
,
Fl(T ) = (Πo − Π
l
n)Sl(T )a¨x, (32)
where Πln is the net replacement ratio for the new public pension with linear salary.
For the exponential salary case (for notational convenience, in the following we will write g
and k in the place of ge and ke):
Fe(t) = x0e
r∗t +
ˆ t
0
kS0e
gser
∗(t−s)ds =
[
x0 −
kS0
g − r∗
]
er
∗t +
kS0
g − r∗
egt. (33)
Fe(T ) = (Πo − Π
e
n)Se(T )a¨x, (34)
where Πen is the net replacement ratio for the new public pension with exponential salary.
Solving the system (28) in both cases, we find the following solutions
α(t) =
(
1−
1
a
)
e−a(T−t) +
1
a
, (35)
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βl(t) = −2Fl(T )e
−a˜(T−t) +
k4
r
(
1 +
g
r
)
e(r−a˜)(t−t) +
1
a˜
(
k5 +
k1g
aa˜
+
k2g
a˜
)
+
+
k4g
r
te(r−a˜)(T−t) +
g
a˜
(
k1
a
+ k2
)
t +
k3
r∗ − a˜
[
er
∗t − ea˜t+(r
∗−a˜)T
]
+
−
[
k4
r
+
k5
a˜
+
k4g
r2
+
k1g
a(a˜)2
+
k2g
(a˜)2
+
(
k4g
r
+
k1g
aa˜
+
k2g
a˜
)
T
]
e−a˜(T−t),
βe(t) =− 2Fe(T )e
−a˜(T−t) −
k4
g − r
e(g+a)t−aT −
k˜4
g − a˜
egt+
+
(
k4
g − r
+
k˜4
g − a˜
)
ea˜t+(g−a˜)T −
k˜3
r∗ − a˜
[
ea˜t+(r
∗−a˜)T − er
∗t
]
,
γi(t) = + e
−ρ(T−t)
ˆ T
t
[
Fi(s)
2 + ci(s)βi(s) + λ
2βi(s)
2
4α(s)
]
eρ(T−s)ds+
+ Fi(T )
2e−ρ(T−t) i = l, e
where
a˜ = a+ r, k1 = 2kS0, k2 =
2kS0
r∗
, k3 = 2x0 + k2 +
2kgS0
(r∗)2
, k4 = k1 −
k1
a
,
k5 =
k1
a
+ k2
(
1 +
g
r∗
)
, k˜2 =
2kS0
g − r∗
, k˜3 = 2x0 − k˜2, k˜4 =
k1
a
− k˜2.
Substituting these solutions into (26), we obtain the two optimal investments
y∗l (t) and y
∗
e(t), t ∈ [0, T ].
Finally, we observe that condition (22) is satisfied. Indeed,
Vxx = 2e
−ρtα(t) = 2e−ρt(e−a(T−t) + a−1(1− e−a(T−t))).
If a > 0, then (e−a(T−t) + a−1(1− e−a(T−t))) > 0, obviously.
If a < 0, then (e−a(T−t) + a−1(1− e−a(T−t))) > 0, because a−1 < 0 and also 1− e−a(T−t) < 0.
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5 Simulations
We have carried out several numerical simulations in order to investigate some quantities
of interest to the pension fund member when the model is implemented in the practice. In
particular, we have investigated to what extent the gap between the old pension and the
new pension is filled. We have first considered a base case, and then made some sensitivity
analysis.
5.1 Base case: Assumptions
The assumptions for the base case are the following:
• the initial fund is X(0) = 1;
• the public pension contribution is c = 33%;
• the mean GDP growth rate is w = 1.5%;
• the riskless interest rate is r = 1.5%;
• the drift of the risky asset is µ = 6%;
• the diffusion of the risky asset is σ = 12%;
• the intertemporal discount factor is ρ = 3%;
• the annuity value is calculated with the Italian projected mortality table IP55 (for
males born between 1948 and 1960); it is a¨65(1.5%) = 17.875; therefore, the conversion
factor from lump sum to annuity is β = 1/a¨65(1.5%) = 0.0056;
• the age when the member joins the scheme is x0 = 30;
• the time horizon is T = 35 meaning that the retirement age is xT = 65;
• the initial salary is S(0) = 1.
We have considered two different salary growths, with different values for the annual salary
increase g and the annual contribution rate k:
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• exponential salary: Se(·) as in formula (30) with ge = 6% and salary contribution
percentage ke = 10%;
• linear salary: Sl(·) as in formula (29) and gl = 8% and salary contribution percentage
kl = 4%.
In the simulations, we have discretized the Brownian motion with a discretization step
equal to two weeks (∆t = 1/26), and we have simulated its behaviour over time in 1000
different scenarios. At each time point, we have not applied the optimal unconstrained
investment strategy y∗(t), because short-selling and borrowing are likely to be forbidden.
We have, instead, implemented the “sub-optimal” constrained investment strategies, which
are constrained to stay between 0 and 1. In particular, the sub-optimal yso(t) is defined as
yso(t) =


0 for y∗(t) < 0
y∗(t) for y∗(t) ∈ [0, 1]
1 for y∗(t) > 0
where y∗(t) is the optimal investment strategy.3
The adoption of constrained investment strategies leads, as a desirable consequence, the
fund not to run under 0. Constrained suboptimal strategies of this type are not new in
the literature and they are good approximations of the optimal investment strategies. They
were applied, e.g., by Gerrard et al. (2006) and Vigna (2014) in the context of DC pension
schemes with a constant interest rate, and they proved to be satisfactory: with respect to the
unrestricted case the effect on the final results turned out to be negligible and the controls
resulted to be more stable over time. In each scenario of market returns, the sub-optimal
value yso(t), t ∈ [0, T ], has been calculated and then adopted for the fund growth.
3In the following figures we have denoted the “sub-optimal” constrained investment strategy by y∗(·) and
the “sub-optimal” constrained fund growth by X∗(·) for the sake of simplicity.
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5.2 Base case: Results
Regarding the investment strategy adopted and the evolution of the fund over time in the
base case, we present the following results:
• Table 1 reports, for both cases of exponential and linear growths, the old pension Po,
the new pension Pn, the old net replacement ratio Πo, the new replacement ratio Πn,
the rate of growth of the targets r∗ and the last salary S(T );
• the two graphs of Figure 1 report some percentiles (graph on the left) and mean and
standard deviation (graph on the right) of the distribution, over the 1000 scenarios, of
the investment strategy yso(t) for t ∈ [0, T ], for the exponential salary growth;
• the two graphs of Figure 2 report some percentiles (graph on the left) and mean and
standard deviation (graph on the right) of the distribution, over the 1000 scenarios, of
the fund Xso(t) for t ∈ [0, T ], for the exponential salary growth;
• the two graphs of Figure 3 report some percentiles (graph on the left) and mean and
standard deviation (graph on the right) of the distribution, over the 1000 scenarios, of
the investment strategy yso(t) for t ∈ [0, T ], for the linear salary growth;
• the two graphs of Figure 4 report some percentiles (graph on the left) and mean and
standard deviation (graph on the right) of the distribution, over the 1000 scenarios, of
the fund Xso(t) for t ∈ [0, T ], for the linear salary growth.
Po Pn Πo Πn r
∗ S(T)
Se 5.716 2.657 0.7 0.325 0.078 8.166
Sl 2.66 1.936 0.7 0.509 0.049 3.8
Table 1.
16
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
t
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
y*(t): percentiles for base case and exp salaries
5th
25th
50th
75th
95th
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
t
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
y*(t): mean and std dev for base case and exp salaries
mean
std dev
Figure 1: Optimal investment strategy, exponential salary growth
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Figure 2: Fund growth, exponential salary growth
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Figure 3: Optimal investment strategy, linear salary growth
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Figure 4: Fund growth, linear salary growth
We observe the following:
1. as expected, with exponential salary growth the final salary is significantly larger (more
than double) than that with linear salary growth; therefore, despite the old replacement
ratio (that does not depend on the salary growth) is the same (70%), the old pension
is much larger with a dynamic career than with a smooth one;
2. the investment strategy for the exponential growth is remarkably riskier than that for
the linear growth: for the exponential growth in almost 75% of the cases the portfolio
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is entirely invested in the risky asset for all t, while for the linear growth all percentiles
of yso(t) (apart from the 95th one) decrease gradually from 1 to 0 over time;
3. the larger riskiness of the strategy for the exponential growth is due to the larger gap
between the old and the new pension: the old replacement ratio is 70% in both cases,
but the new replacement ratio (that does depend on the salary growth) is 32% for
the exponential growth and 51% for the linear growth; the larger gap to fill in for
the exponential increase entails riskier strategies, and the smaller gap to fill in for the
linear increase entails less risky strategies; these results seem to suggest that the new
reform affects to a larger extent workers with a dynamic career than workers with a
smooth career;
4. with both salary increases, on average the investment in the risky asset decreases over
time and approaches 0 when retirement approaches; this result is in line with previous
results on optimal investment strategies for DC pension schemes (see e.g. Haberman
& Vigna (2002)) and is consistent with the lifestyle strategy (see Cairns (2000)), that
is an investment strategy largely adopted in DC pension funds in the UK.
Finally, because the aim of this work is to reduce the gap between the old and the new
pension, it is fundamental to investigate to what extent the gap is reduced. If the worker
joins the pension fund for T years, then at retirement he will receive the new pension Pn
plus the additional pension Padd provided by the pension fund. Therefore, his total pension
will be Ptot, given by
Ptot = Pn + Padd
where
Padd =
Xso(T )
a¨65(1.5%)
.
In order to compare the old pension with the total pension,
• Figure 5 reports, in the case of exponential salary growth, the distribution, over the
1000 scenarios, of the final pension Ptot that the retiree will receive; the old pension Po
is also indicated, as a benchmark;
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• Figure 6 reports, in the case of linear salary growth, the distribution, over the 1000
scenarios, of the final pension Ptot that the retiree will receive; the old pension Po is
also indicated, as a benchmark.
Pension distribution with xT=65 and T=35 for exp salaries
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Figure 5: Distribution of final pension, exponential salary growth
Pension distribution with xT=65 and T=35 for lin salaries
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Figure 6: Distribution of final pension, linear salary growth
We notice that
• in the case of exponential salary growth, the final pension is distributed more uniformly
between 3.3 and 5.6 (the old pension being 5.7), while for the linear salary growth there
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is a large concentration of the final pension on the immediate left of the target, between
2.5 and the target 2.66;
• what observed above is due to the fact that it is easier to reach the target in the case of
linear increase than in the case of exponential increase, because (as observed in point
3. above) the gap between the old and the new pension is larger with the exponential
increase than with the linear increase;
• the fact that it is relatively easy to approach the target with the linear increase is
consistent with the rate of increase of the annual targets r∗ = 4.86% (see Table 1).
This rate lies between the return on the riskless asset (1.5%) and the expected return
on the risky asset (6%); opposite, with exponential salary increase the rate of increase
of annual targets is r∗ = 7.76% that is larger than the expected return on the risky
asset.
6 Changing the retirement age
In Section 5.2 we have set the retirement age equal to 65. It is clear that results strongly
depend on the retirement age. In this section we consider different retirement ages, namely
60, 63, 65, 67 and 70, and investigate how the distribution of the final pension Ptot changes
accordingly.
Table 2 reports, for each retirement age considered xT = x, the annuity value a¨x, the
conversion factor from lump sum into pension βx, and, for both cases of exponential and
linear growths, the old pension Po, the new pension Pn, the old net replacement ratio Πo
and the new net replacement ratio Πn.
xT T a¨x βx P
e
o
Pe
n
Πe
o
Πe
n
Pl
o
Pl
n
Πl
o
Πl
n
60 30 20.95 0.048 3.63 1.57 0.6 0.26 2.04 1.26 0.6 0.37
63 33 19.11 0.052 4.78 2.15 0.66 0.3 2.4 1.63 0.66 0.45
65 35 17.88 0.056 5.72 2.66 0.7 0.33 2.66 1.94 0.7 0.51
67 37 16.64 0.06 6.81 3.29 0.74 0.36 2.93 2.3 0.74 0.58
70 40 14.81 0.068 8.82 4.56 0.8 0.41 3.36 2.98 0.8 0.71
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Table 2.
The graphs in Figure 7 report the pension distribution with the different retirement ages
considered in the case of exponential salary growth, while the graphs in Figure 8 report those
related to the linear salary increase.
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Pension distribution with xT=67 and T=37
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Pension distribution with xT=70 and T=40
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Figure 7: Pension distribution with different retirement ages (exponential growth)
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Pension distribution with xT=60 and T=30 for lin salaries
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Pension distribution with xT=63 and T=33 for lin salaries
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Pension distribution with xT=65 and T=35 for lin salaries
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Pension distribution with xT=67 and T=37 for lin salaries
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Figure 8: Pension distribution with different retirement ages (linear growth)
We notice the following:
• The comparison between exponential and linear salary increase confirms what already
observed in Section 5.2 at all ages: the distribution of the final pension is more spread
out in the area on the left of the old pension in the case of exponential salary increase,
while it is more peaked immediately on the left of the old pension in case of linear target,
showing the larger chance of approaching the target in the case of linear increase.
• With both salary increases, we observe that it is easier to reach the target with an older
retirement age: higher retirement age means lower gap between the old and the total
pension. This is intuitive and expected, and is due to different reasons: (i) because
of actuarial fairness principles, the highest the retirement age, the lower the price
of the lifetime annuity; (ii) a higher retirement age also means that the fund grows
for a longer time, meaning a higher lump sum to be converted into pension. These
two factors imply that the higher the retirement age, the higher the final pension,
everything else being equal.
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• In the extreme case of linear salary increase and retirement age equal to 70, the dif-
ference between the old and the new pension is so small that investing in the riskless
asset for the entire working life (40 years) is sufficient to cover the gap, and the final
pension Ptot = 3.464 turns out to be higher than the old pension Po = 3.36 in 100% of
the cases.
7 Break even points
In the previous sections we have seen that, expectedly, with both salary growths the old
pension is larger than the new pension. This result heavily depends on the choice of the
parameters and may no longer hold if some parameters change. We have calculated what
values of some key parameters would equate the old pension to the new pension, leaving the
values of the remaining parameters equal to those of the base case. In particular, we have
calculated the break even points for the parameters w, β and g. Figure 9 reports the six
plots of the quantity Po−Pn (difference between the old and the new pension) as a function
of β, g and w, in both cases of exponential and linear salary. In particular, figures 9a, 9e
and 9c report the exponential salary case, while figures 9b, 9f and 9d report the linear salary
case. The red point is the base case, the green point on the x−axis is the break even point
that equals the old pension to the new pension.
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(a) Break even point for β (exp salary)
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(b) Break even point for β (lin salary)
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(c) Break even point for w (exp salary)
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(d) Break even point for w (lin salary)
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09
g
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Evolution of p
o
-p
n
 as a function of g: exponential salary and base case
p
o
(g)-p
n
(g)
g std
g*
(e) Break even point for g (exp salary)
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(f) Break even point for g (lin salary)
Figure 9: Break even points w.r.t. β, g and w for exponential and linear salary.
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We notice the following:
• the difference between the old and the new pension decreases with β, i.e., it increases
with the price of the annuity 1/β. This is obvious, because the old pension is not
affected by the price of the annuity, while the new pension is affected by β and it
increases with it; therefore, the higher β the higher Pn, the lower Po − Pn. With
exponential increase, the old and the new pension are equal when β = 0.12, that
corresponds to price of the unitary annuity equal to approximately 8.33, against the
base value of 17.785; with linear increase, the old and the new pension are equal when
approximately β = 0.078, that corresponds to price of the unitary annuity equal to
12.82, against the base value of 17.785;
• the difference between the old and the new pension decreases with w. This is again
obvious, because the old pension is not affected by the mean GDP growth rate w,
while the new pension is affected by w and it increases with it; therefore, the larger w
the larger the new pension, the lower the gap between the old and the new pension.
With exponential increase, the old and the new pension are equal with a mean GDP of
approximately w = 6.5%, with linear increase, the old and the new pension are equal
with mean GDP of approximately w = 3.5%;
• the difference between the old and the new pension increases with g. This result is
interesting, because both the old pension and the new pension are positively correlated
with the salary growth g, but to a different extent: the old pension is affected by it only
via the final salary that is used to calculate the pension income, the new pension is
affected by it via the yearly contributions that are paid into the fund and accumulated
until retirement. Figures 9e and 9f seem to suggest that the impact of g on the old
pension is larger than that on the new pension, leading to a larger gap in case of
increase of g;
• the break even point for the salary increase rate is about ge = 1% for exponential
salary increase, about gl = 1.5% for linear increase. This result indicates that with
sufficiently small salary increase the old pension and the new pension coincide. In the
presence of salary increase rates smaller than the break even point, the new pension is
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larger than the old one. This is consistent with what observed in point 3. in Section
5.2: the effect of the pension reform is more considerable for workers with dynamic
career than for workers with smooth career.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have tackled the issue of the gap between an “old” pre-reform salary-related
pension and a “new” post-reform contribution-based pension. We have investigated to what
extent the gap can be reduced by adding to the state pension another pension provided by a
DC pension scheme. We have used stochastic optimal control and a target-based approach to
find the optimal investment strategy suitable to cover the gap between the salary-related and
the contribution-based pension. The numerical simulations suggest that the gap between the
salary-related pension and the contribution-based pension is larger for workers with dynamic
career than for workers with a stagnant career, meaning more difficulties for the first class
of workers to fill in the gap than for the second class of workers, even by assuming a higher
savings capacity. Intuitively, the gap is easier to cover in the case of late retirement, and
vice versa. This result is consistent with results in Borella & Coda Moscarola (2010). A slow
salary increase associate to late retirement age can produce a new pension that is almost
equal to (or even exceeds) the old pension. Expectedly, the gap reduces when the mean
GDP increase and when the price of the annuity increases. Interestingly, the gap increases
when the rate of increase of the salary increases.
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